Abstract. In this work, we present efficient public-key encryption schemes resilient against linear related key attacks (RKA) under standard assumptions and in the standard model. Specifically, we obtain encryption schemes based on hardness of factoring, BDDH and LWE that remain secure even against an adversary that may query the decryption oracle on linear shifts of the actual secret key. Moreover, the ciphertext overhead is only an additive constant number of group elements.
Introduction
The traditional model for security assumes that the internal states of the honest parties are completely hidden from the adversary. We often also extend the same assumption to cryptographic hardware devices such as a RSA SecurID token; here, we assume the internal states to be both completely hidden and protected from the adversary. However, recent timing, 'cold-boot' and virtual-machine attacks demonstrated that physical side-channels can leak partial information about internal states of program executions [32, 25, 40] . Similarly, given physical access to a hardware device, we can use fault injection techniques to tamper with and induce modifications to the internal state of the device [10, 8] . When an adversary tampers with the key stored in a cryptographic hardware device and subsequently observes the outcome of the cryptographic primitive under this modified key, we have a related-key attack (RKA) [21, 7] . The key here may be a signing key of a certificate authority or SSL server or a decryption key for an encryption scheme.
RKA security
In this work, we study public-key encryption schemes secure against related-key attacks (RKA).
-We work with a tag-based notion of CCA-security [34, 30] , where we derive the tag using a strong one-time signature scheme. Moreover, we require that the ciphertexts C and C ′ share the same tag. We may then consider two cases: if C shares the same tag as the challenge ciphertext, then the onetime signature scheme tells us that C must equal the challenge ciphertext. On the other hand, if C has a different tag from the challenge ciphertext, then so does C ′ and we can decrypt C ′ using the decryption oracle in the CCA-security game. This suffices for weak CC-RKA security, where the RKA decryption oracle refuses to act whenever the ciphertext it is given matches the challenge ciphertext.
-In order to achieve "full fledged" CC-RKA security, we need to handle the case where the ciphertext C equals the challenge ciphertext but ϕ(sk) ̸ = sk. Here, we simply stipulate that the challenge ciphertext is an invalid ciphertext under any key sk ′ ̸ = sk; we refer to this property as fingerprinting (c.f. [4, 7] ). In other words, a random valid ciphertext (by itself, even without the public key) uniquely determines a consistent secret key.
At this point, it suffices to describe how we instantiate the underlying building blocks, namely a tag-based CCA-secure encryption scheme that achieves both finger-printing and key-homomorphism, as well as an efficient strong one-time signature scheme. Achieving finger-printing. As it turns out, the Cramer-Shoup CCA-secure constructions [15, 16] do not satisfy the finger-printing; this is in some sense inherent since the smoothness requirement in hash proof systems essentially stipulate the secret key has some residual entropy given only its evaluation on a no instance of the underlying subset membership problem (but not the public key).
Instead, we turn to constructions of CCA-secure public-key encryption based on the "all-but-one extraction" paradigm, starting with [9] , and further developed in [12, 11, 30, 38, 26, 1, 31, 42, 35] . In these constructions, the secret key is often only a single group element, which makes achieving fingerprinting much simpler. Moreover, we can hope to realize CC-RKA security from search assumptions, which encompass a larger class of intractable problems than decisional assumptions.
Achieving key homomorphism. This leads us to our final technical hurdle, namely that CCA-secure public-key encryption schemes based on search assumptions may not be key-homomorphic. For instance, the Hofheinz-Kiltz factoringbased scheme [26] is not itself key-homomorphic; this is because the underlying Blum-Blum-Shub PRG is not homomorphic. As it turns out, the "all-but-one extraction" paradigm allows us to overcome this hurdle too -informally, the trapdoor decryption algorithm allows us to recover the seed of the PRG (for CCA security, it suffices to recover the output of the PRG). For this reason, we present our schemes via the framework of adaptive trapdoor relations [42, 31] , which seems particularly suited for our analysis, as it abstracts the "all-butone" aspect for achieving CCA-security, allowing us to directly focus on the new challenges posed by CC-RKA-security.
One-time signatures. As a result of independent interest, we present a new strong one-time signature scheme based on hardness of factoring, which is inspired by Groth's one-time signature based on hardness of discrete log [24] . In Appendix B, we also sketch a generic construction of strong one-time signatures starting from any Σ-protocol. In the application to CCA-security and our CC-RKA-secure schemes, we want to design one-time signature schemes where the total cost of key generation and signing is small. In our factoringbased scheme, the signing algorithm does not require knowing the factorization of the modulus and we may therefore use a modulus from the public parameter instead of generating RSA modulus from scratch (which requires a linear number of exponentiations).
Discussion
There is a general transformation for achieving security against linear related key attacks via algebraic manipulation detection (AMD) codes [18, 20] -in the case of encryption, this requires modifying the key generation algorithm of a CCAsecure encryption scheme, so that the stored secret key is the encoded version of the original secret key, using such a code (thereby increasing the secret key size). Our constructions achieve several advantages over this generic approach: first, the key generation algorithm coincides with existing CCA-secure encryption schemes. This offers compatibility with existing public key set-ups. Second, we avoid the blow-up in key sizes. Finally, the existing constructions of AMD codes only work over finite fields, which are not applicable to the constructions based on hardness of factoring.
Additional related work. The works of Lucks, Goldenberg and Liskov, and Bellare, Cash and Miller [33, 22, 7] gave constructions of RKA-secure primitives from RKA-secure building blocks, but provided no new constructions of the latter and hence of the former. Also, a number of works gave RKA-secure schemes in the standard model, notably symmetric encryption [2, 3] , signatures [23] (based on q-ary assumption) in addition to PRFs [4] ; these schemes all rely lattices and Diffie-Hellman type assumptions, none of these are based on number-theoretic assumptions. There are also feasibility results on RKA-secure public-key encryption based on non-standard assumptions, e.g. [28] as well as results on tamper-resilient UC-secure computation [14] . We also point out here that encryption schemes secure against linear related-key attacks have also found applications in garbled circuits used in secure computation [3, 29] .
Organization. We present our main construction in Section 3. We present the instantiations from various classes of assumptions in Sections 5 through 6.
Strong one-time signatures. For a stateful adversary A, we define the advantage function Adv.OTS A (λ) to be:
A signature scheme is a strong one-time signature if for all PPT adversaries A, the advantage Adv.OTS A (λ) is a negligible function in λ.
Adaptive trapdoor relations. Informally, trapdoor functions are a family of functions {F fid } that are easy to sample, compute and invert with trapdoor, but hard to invert without the trapdoor (we always assume that the functions are injective). In the tag-based setting, the function takes an additional input, namely the tag; also, the trapdoor is independent of the tag. A family of adaptive trapdoor functions [31] is one that remains one-way even if the adversary is given access to an inversion oracle, except the adversary cannot query the oracle on the same tag as that in the challenge. In a trapdoor relation, instead of requiring that F fid be efficiently computable, we only require that we can efficiently sample from the distribution (s, F fid (tag, s)) for a random s given fid, tag.
More precisely, a family of (tag-based) adaptive trapdoor relations [42] is given by a family of injective functions {F fid } that satisfies the following properties:
(trapdoor generation.) There is an efficient randomized algorithm TDG that outputs a random (fid, tid).
(public sampling.) There is an efficient randomized algorithm PSamp that on input (fid, tag), outputs (s, F fid (tag, s)) for a random s.
(trapdoor inversion.) There is an efficient algorithm TdInv such that for all (fid, tid) ← TDG and for all tag, y, computes TdInv(tid, tag,
(adaptive one-wayness.) For all efficient stateful adversaries A, the following quantity is negligible in λ:
where A is allowed to query F −1
It is convenient to work with the following stronger notion of adaptive pseudorandomness [37] , where the adversary has to distinguish G(s) from random given y and an inversion oracle, for some pseudorandom generator G associated with the family {F fid }. There is indeed a generic way to obtain adaptive pseudorandomness from adaptive one-wayness via the Goldreich-Levin hard-core bit (since the proof relativizes with respect to the inversion oracle). However, for the concrete instantiations we consider here, there are more efficient ways to derive multiple hard-core bits.
(adaptive pseudorandomness.) For all efficient stateful adversaries A, the following quantity is negligible in λ:
where A is allowed to query F −1 fid (·, ·) on any tag different from tag * .
RKA Security
Related-key derivation functions. Following [5] , a class of Φ of related-key deriving functions (RKDFs) is a finite set of functions, all with the same domain and range that could possibly depend on the public parameter pp. The class of functions should also admit an efficient membership test, and its functions should be efficiently computable. For our concrete instantiations, we consider the class Φ + of linear shifts.
CC-RKA security. We follow the definition of related-key attack (RKA) security from [7, 4] . For a stateful adversary A, we define the advantage function Adv.RKA.PKE A,Φ (λ) to be:
where RKA.Dec(sk, ·, ·) is an oracle that on input (ϕ, C): returns Dec(ϕ(sk), C). We restrict the adversary A to only make queries (ϕ, C) such that ϕ ∈ Φ and (ϕ(sk), C) ̸ = (sk, C * ). An encryption scheme is said to be Φ-CC-RKA secure if for all PPT A, the advantage Adv.RKA.PKE A,Φ (λ) is a negligible function in λ.
Weaker CC-RKA security. We also consider weak CC-RKA security, where in the security experiment, we further restrict the adversary A to only make queries (ϕ, C) such that ϕ ∈ Φ and C ̸ = C * where C * is the challenge ciphertext. Previously, we also allow queries (ϕ, C * ) as long as ϕ(sk) ̸ = sk.
Realization from Adaptive Trapdoor Relations
In this section, we present our constructions of RKA-secure encryption via adaptive trapdoor relations. We begin by introducing two additional notions for adaptive trapdoor relations.
Φ-Key homomorphism. We say that {F fid } is Φ-key homomorphic if there is a PPT algorithm T such that for all ϕ ∈ Φ and all tid, tag, y:
In fact, a weaker formulation that asserts an oracle PPT algorithm T that outputs TdInv(ϕ(tid), tag, y) given oracle access to TdInv(tid, tag, ·) suffices for our proofs. This latter formulation is more similar to the formulation of keymalleability in [4, Section 3.1] for achieving RKA-security for pseudorandom functions. A similar notion also appears in [3] for symmetric-key encryption.
Φ-Fingerprinting.
Informally, Φ-fingerprinting stipulates that any attempt to maul tid invalidates a random output of F fid (·). More formally, for a stateful adversary A, we define the advantage function Adv.FP A,Φ (λ) to be:
and ϕ ∈ Φ and ϕ(tid) ̸ = tid :
A trapdoor relation admits a Φ-fingerprint if for all PPT adversaries A, the advantage Adv.FP A,Φ (λ) is a negligible function in λ. We stress that in the above experiment, the adversary receives tid, which it can use to compute s from y.
Our construction
We present our construction in Fig 1, which is the same as the construction of CCA-secure encryption schemes from adaptive trapdoor relations via strong one-time signatures, as given in [31, 42] . We observe that correctness of the encryption scheme follows readily from the correctness of trapdoor inversion. Φ-CC-RKA security follows from the next technical claim. After the proof, we explain how to deduce Φ-weak-CC-RKA security without relying on Φ-fingerprinting. Proof. In the following, we write C * = vksig * ∥σ * ∥y * ∥ψ * to denote the ciphertext in the Φ-CC-RKA experiment. We proceed via a sequence of games. We start with Game 0 as in the Φ-CC-RKA experiment and end up with a game where the view of A is statistically independent of the challenge bit b. The sequence of games is analogous to those for obtaining CCA security from all-but-one extractable hash proofs and adaptive trapdoor functions [42, 31] ; the main difference lies in handling the RKA queries in the first two games. 
Lemma 1. Let
(Here, we use the fact that the adversary in the Φ-fingerprinting experiment is given tid, which is needed to simulate the decryption oracle.) Therefore, RKA.Dec outputs ⊥ except with negligible probability. 
Compute s
Note that we only query
Observe that vksig, T (pp, ϕ, vksig, y) ) using trapdoor inversion = TdInv(ϕ(tid), vksig, y) using Φ-key homomorphism
Correctness of the simulation follows readily, and thus Games 1 and 2 are identically distributed. We conclude by observing that in Game 3, the distribution of ϕ * is statistically independent of the challenge bit b. Hence, the probability that b ′ = b is exactly 1/2.
⊓ ⊔
Observe that in the above proof, we only used Φ-fingerprinting in the analysis of Game 1 Case 4. For Φ-weak-CC-RKA security, the queries for this case are ruled out by definition and therefore we do not need Φ-fingerprinting.
Instantiations from Hardness of Factoring
Fix a Blum integer N = P Q for λ-bit primes P, Q ≡ 3 (mod 4) such that P = 2p + 1 and Q = 2q + 1 for primes p, q. Let J N denote the subgroup of Z * N with Jacobi symbol +1, and let QR N denote the subgroup of quadratic residues.
Observe that |J N | = 2pq = 2|QR N |. Following [27] , we work over the cyclic group of signed quadratic residues, given by the quotient group QR
is a cyclic group of order pq and is efficiently recognizable (by verifying that the Jacobi symbol is +1). Here, we use a hash function H : {0, 1} * → {0, 1} λ , though we will treat the output of H as a number in Z 2 λ .
Strong one-time signature
For main construction in Section 3, we require efficient strong one-time signature schemes, where the total computational complexity for key generation and signing is small. In addition, we want short verification key and signatures. Previous factoring-based one-time signatures [41, 36] require generating an RSA modulus during key generation, which is computationally expensive. We provide a new construction that uses a public modulus. For the one-time signature, we can work with any Blum integer N = P Q, that is, we do not require that P, Q be safe primes. Proof. Correctness is straight-forward. To establish security, we first describe two simulators Sim 0 , Sim 1 that given (u 0 , s 1 ) and (s 0 , u 1 ) respectively, simulates the verification key and the signature on a single message.
It is straight-forward to check that the outputs of both Sim 0 and Sim 1 are identically distributed to the output of a honestly generated vksig and an honestly generated signature on a single message. Now, we consider several cases for a forgery (e ′ , w ′ ) on m ′ :
-m ′ = m, same e ′ = e: then, w ′ = w.
-e ̸ = e ′ : in Sim 0 , the forgery will allow us to compute the 2 λ 'th root of u
where |e − e ′ | < 2 λ , i.e.:
Using Shamir's GCD in the exponent algorithm, this value along with u 0 allows us to recover a square root of u 0 .
-e = e ′ , H(m) ̸ = H(m ′ ): in Sim 1 , extract a square root of u 1 , analogous to the previous case.
That is, we can show that if an adversary outputs a forgery with probability ϵ, then we can compute a square root of a random challenge u with probability roughly ϵ/2 as follows: we pick b ← r {0, 1}, run Observe that for all tid, ∆ ∈ Z, all tag and all u, τ ∈ QR
The above equality follows from the fact that TdInv returns s = u 
and ⊥ otherwise. 
Instantiations from Diffie-Hellman Assumptions

Strong one-time signature from hardness of discrete log
For completeness, we present here Groth's one-time signature scheme [24, Section 5.4]; we modified the underlying algebra in order to clarify the similarity to our factoring-based scheme. Here, we use a hash function H : {0, 1} * → Z q . The scheme is secure if computing discrete log is hard on average and H is collision resistant. 
Instantiations from BDDH
tid ←r Zq; fid := g tid return (fid, tid)
PSamp(fid, tag; r):
TdInv(tid, tag, u∥τ ):
5. An adaptive trapdoor relation based on BDDH [42, 9] The class Φ + . The functions ϕ ∆ : Z q → Z q in this class are indexed by ∆ ∈ Z q , where ϕ ∆ (tid) := tid + ∆.
Φ
+ -key homomorphism. Observe that for all tid, ∆ ∈ Z q , all tag and all u, τ ∈ G:
The above equality follows from the fact that on both sides of the equation, TdInv computes s such that 
Instantiations from LWE
We rely on a construction from [35, 1] . Here, G is a public matrix with special structure for which the bounded-distance decoding problem is easy. The above equality just follows from the fact that on both sides of the equation, TdInv computes
